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Abstract 
 
A safety instrumented system (SIS) is used to implement one or more Safety Instrumented 
Functions (SIFs)1 which are designed to reduce the likelihood of hazardous risk by decreasing 
the frequency of unwanted events (accidents).  The amount of risk reduction that an SIS can 
provide is represented by its safety integrity level (SIL). The SIS is designed to detect when the 
process reaches a hazardous condition and respond accordingly to move the process to a safe 
state, thus preventing the unwanted accident from occurring.  Studies indicate however, that over 
50% of all SIS failures are related Systematic faults introduced by human error.  While many SIS 
systems boast having SIL 3 certification, it’s often the human interactions that render many of 
these well intended systems to be essentially idle.  A cause and effects methodology is an 
approach many in the industry are exploring to help reduce human errors throughout the entire 
safety lifecycle of the SIS. 
 
1 Introduction to Cause and Effects Methodology 
Logic is defined as the science of correct reasoning, or necessary connection or outcome, as 
through working of cause and effect.  Any problem, if approached logically, will either yield a 
solution, or verify that a solution is not possible.  By examining all eventualities with respect to 
causes and effects a solution can usually be found. 
 
																																																								
1 IEC 61511-1:2016, page 26 - 3.2.66 Safety Instrumented Function - SIF 
The cause and effect diagram is used for defining how and when actions are executed in a safety 
system.  This methodology involves organizing process events into categories of causes and 
effects and then linking them together logically via the intersection which will indicate what 
effect(s) will result from which active cause(s).   
There are, therefore, three key fields of information contained in the cause and effect diagram.  A 
cause occupies a row, an effect occupies a column and the intersection is the cell which is 
common between a cause row and an effect column and determiners the relationship between 
both of them. These fields may contain and represent the following functional requirements for a 
safety instrumented system as shown below in Figure 1:  
 Cause - This field reflects a process deviation.  When the cause tags meet certain user-configured 
conditions, it becomes active. 
 Effect - This field reflects a process action.  When the effect is active, the effect tags will be set to their 
failsafe values. 
 Intersection - This field determines how the effect responds to the cause.  If the intersection 
is empty, the cause does not influence the effect.  If the intersection is configured, an active 
cause will trigger the associated effect and the effect will become active. 
 
Figure 1 - Cause and Effect Diagram  
2 The Safety Lifecycle 
In 1995, the U.K. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) published a report titled “Out of Control: 
Why Control Systems Go Wrong and How to Prevent Failure”2  where they analyzed the root 
cause of several industrial accidents that were initiated by failure of the control system and 
published the chart shown in Figure 2, showing where failure occurred.  They updated their 






In many ways, it was the findings of this study that led to the development of the safety design 
lifecycle which serves as the basis for international standards on functional safety such as the 
IEC 61511:2016 standard.  The safety design lifecycle is a practical methodology that defines the 
process necessary to ensure overall plant safety by defining a sequence of steps and deliverables 
from each phase to help prevent the failures that were identified in the HSE report. 
 
Figure 3, shows the safety life-cycle as described in the IEC 61511 standard3.  The lifecycle can 
be divided into three main phases; the analysis phase, the realization phase and the operation 
phase.  The analysis phase is focused on determining and documenting how much safety is 
																																																								
2 Out of Control – Why Control System go wrong and how to prevent Failure – 2nd Edition 2003 – Page 31 
3 IEC 61511;2016, page 38 
Figure 2 - Root Cause of Control System Failures 
needed. The realization phase is focused on the design and implementation of the system and 
safety achieved. The operation phase is focused on the activities and documentation required in 
operating and maintaining the system to ensure the performance is maintained.   
The safety life-cycle phases are meant to address the root causes of failure as identified by the 
HSE.  The analysis phase is focused on addressing the percent of failures caused by improper 
specification by requiring quantitative risk analysis and risk reduction techniques resulting in a 
safety requirements specification (SRS).  The realization phase is focused on minimizing the 
failures caused by design & implementation and installation & commissioning.  It does so by 
requiring documented verification that the design meets the targets defined in the analysis phase.  
The operation phase is focused on addressing the percentage of failures caused by improper 
operation & maintenance and changes after commissioning.  Again, this is accomplished through 
mandatory procedures and documentation.   
   
Figure 3 - SIS Safety Life-Cycle Phases 
3 The IEC 61511 standard requirements  
In June 2016, the IEC technical committee released the 2nd edition of their functional safety 
standard titled “Safety instrumented systems for the process sector”.  This edition cancels and 
replaces the first edition which was published in 2003, and includes a number of editorial 
improvements (definitions, etc.), and technical changes specifically around the requirements to 
improve the management of functional safety.   
 
Safety instrumented systems (SISs) have been around for many years to perform safety 
instrumented functions (SFIs) in the process industries.  If instrumentation is to be effectively 
used for SIFs, it is essential that they can achieve certain minimum performance levels.  The IEC 
61511 standard drives towards two basic concepts which are fundamental to its application, the 
SIS safety life-cycle and safety integrity levels (SILs).   
 
Fundamentally, the goals and purpose of the 2nd edition of the IEC 61511 standard is identical to 
the first edition which maintains the same general title “Functional safety: Safety Instrumented 
Systems for the process industry sector” as well consisting of the same 3 parts: 
 
1. Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements - normative 
2. Part 2: Guidelines in the application of IEC 61511-1- informative 
3. Part 3: Guidance for the determination of the required safety integrity levels - informative 
 
The principle behind this standard is simple.  Follow the activities of the safety lifecycle, make 
sure you achieve the defined minimum requirements, and document everything.  This approach 
is intended to direct a process that is rational and consistent.  To facilitate this approach, this 
standard requires the following: 
 
 a hazard and risk assessment is carried out to identify the overall safety requirements 
 The allocation of the safety requirements to the safety instrumented system(s) 
 works within a framework applicable to all instrumented methods of achieving functional 
safety 
 Details the use of certain activities, such as safety management, which may be applicable 
to all methods of achieving functional safety 
 
Specifically this standard addresses all safety life-cycle phases from initial concept, design, 
implementation, operation and maintenance through to decommissioning.  In order to claim 
conformance to this standard the owner/operator would have to demonstrate that the 
requirements outlined in clause 5 through 19 have been satisfied.  This paper will discuss how 
adopting a cause and effects methodology, may be used to satisfy most of these requirements.  
 
Clause 5: Management of functional safety 
The objective of clause 5 is to identify the management activities (organizational, planning, 
assessment, etc.) that are necessary to ensure the functional safety for the SIS is met.   
In general it contains the policy and strategy for the organization on how to achieve functional 
safety.   Sub-clause 5.2.7 requires SIS configuration management techniques have to be 
developed specifically for the application program of the SIS where proper revision control shall 
be maintained.  An example of revision control is shown in Figure 4.  This process requires that 
if further changes are made (after properly reviewed and approved) by the SIS designers, the 
revision of the cause and effects diagram may be incrementally advanced forward allowing for 
appropriate descriptions of the changes to be captured as well. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Example of Revision Control 
 
Clause 6: Safety life-cycle requirements 
The main objective of clause 6 is to define the phases and establish the requirements of the SIS 
safety life-cycle activities and to ensure that adequate planning exists to make certain the SIS 
meets the safety requirements. 
A cause and effects diagram will not only help management organize and define their safety 
strategy, but will also help to present their safety philosophy in a clear concise manner that 
various levels can read and understand.  Prior to this, a control narrative would have to be 
derived from reading complex logic charts.   This process often took many man hours to compete 
as it might require the attention of multi-disciplined personnel.  
The cause and effects diagram will significantly reduce the time it takes to organize the technical 
functions of the safety system. It is noted in the standard that the SIS requirements should be 
expressed and structured in such a way that they are clear, precise, verifiable, maintainable, and 
written to aid comprehension by those who are likely to utilize the information at any phase of 
the lifecycle.  
Traditionally, safety logic would be in the form of high level programming language such as 
Boolean algebra or ladder logic.  It would consist of several defined “logical connections” or 
relationships between variables that depend on, or follow each other logically.  Either of these 
procedures are fine for Safety PLC programmers, but additional work would still be required to 
meet the criteria for properly documenting the safety functions. 
Take for example the logic shown below in Figure 5.  This indicates how a fired heater shutdown 
system needs to be operated.  This form is again fine for programming but would not be 
acceptable for documentation.  From this logic diagram, a control narrative would still need to be 
developed to clarify the operation of this “de-energized to trip” logic circuit as many would find 
this counter-intuitive to the way it is diagramed below where a logic 0 at the final control 
element would equal an active state  (i.e. closed). 
 
Figure 5 - Sample Shutdown Logic 
Figure 6, shows the same fired heater shutdown logic, but illustrated in a cause and effects 
diagram.  This view shows a more concise and descriptive way that when either emergency trip 
pushbuttons HS-1 or HS-2 are activated, as defined by the relationship of the intersection, they 
would logically demand that all three control elements (valves and damper) close.  In addition, 
either PSL-2 or BS-1 would demand “close” the pilot gas shutoff valve, and either PSLL-1 or 






Figure 6 - Cause and Effects Diagram 
Clause 7: Verification  
The main objective of clause 7 is to demonstrate by review, analysis, and/or testing that the 
required output for each phase of the safety life-cycle meets the requirements. 
Verification planning requires a number of items to be properly addressed throughout the safety 
life-cycle.  One area of concern is the management of change (MOC) of the SIS logic.  Most 
modern day software tools provide an option that allows your cause and effect diagram tool to 
perform a compare function.  This utility would allow the engineer to compare the current 
program to one that is stored offline, thus being able to identify and record any functional logic 
changes that might have taken place during the verification phase.  Figure 7 below illustrates an 
example of compare utility; where the output is in a comprehensive report that describes in great 
detail the differences between the two documents.  
 
Figure 7 - Management of Change (MOC) Requirements 
 
Clause 8: Process Hazard and Risk Assessment 
Identifying the hazards and/or hazardous events of the process along with determining the risk 
associated with these hazards is the main objective of clause 8.  This would also include 
determining if any safety functions are necessary to reduce the risk and if so, are any of these 
safety functions SIFs?   
While there maybe a number of engineering documents needed to conduct a proper process 
hazard analysis (PHA) to gain a thorough understanding of the process such as sequential 
function charts, process flow diagrams and piping and instrumentation diagrams, the output of 
the PHA could be in the form of a cause and effect diagram to list the identified SIFs as shown in 
Figure 8.    
Clause 9: Allocation of safety functions to protection layers  
In this clause, safety functions are allocated to specific protection layers.  It should be noted that 
not all safety functions will be part of the SIS (e.g. mechanical relief device), however those 
identified as SIFs could be managed and documented within a cause and effects diagram.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Hazard and Risk Assessment to Protection Layers 
 
Clause 9: Allocation of safety functions to protection layers  
In this clause, safety functions are allocated to specific protection layers.  It should be noted that 
not all safety functions will be part of the SIS (e.g. mechanical relief device), however those 
identified as SIFs could be managed and documented within a cause and effects diagram.  
 
Figure 9 - Recording SIL Requirement for Each SIF 
In addition one of the requirements of this phase is to determine the necessary risk reduction or 
SIL for each SIF.  This may also be recorded and documented within the same cause and effect 
diagram during the configuration of each specific effect as shown below in Figure 9.   
Clause 10: SIS safety requirements specification (SRS)  
The objective of this clause is to specify the requirements for the SIS including a clear and 
concise description of the application program as well as the architecture of the SIS.   
Cause and effects diagrams play a crucial role in providing an intuitive documentation format for 
the application program.  Conventional programming tools such as ladder logic, or function 
block diagrams are not considered adequate since they do not convey the ease of comprehension, 
therefore it would typically require a separate control narrative to verbally describe the safety 
functions that are being executed in the application program.  Cause and effects diagrams will 
generally contain the configuration details (architecture voting, input and output tags, etc.) along 
with the options (bypass tags, time delays, etc.) to fully satisfy the requirements of the SRS. 
Clause 11: SIS design and engineering  
The objective of this clause is to design and engineer the SIS to meet the specified integrity 
requirements (e.g. SIL, risk reduction, PFD, etc.).  In many cases SIS designers have found 
success leveraging cause and effect diagrams to help meet some of clause 11 requirements for 
operability, maintainability, diagnostics, inspections and testability to reduce the likelihood of 
dangerous failures.  The level of implementation will vary from using the cause and effects as 
the design document to a full replication of an active cause and effects diagram running in the 
SIS logic solver, where the latter would be preferred as it would remove potential human errors 
during the translation from to the application program.  In some cases end-users have reported 
that this feature alone can reduce their detailed design effort by 50%, not to mention the 
reduction in translation errors. 
Clause 12: SIS application program development  
The objective of this clause is to define the requirements for the development of the application 
program.  In the first edition of the standard this clause was 17 pages, it is now 3 and a half 
pages.  This clause has been significantly rewritten to remove life-cycle steps covered in other 
sections, and now only provides useful information around the requirements for proper 
application design, development and implementation. 
Using a cause and effects tool that is capable of developing the application program will vary 
from SIS vendors, thus to avoid commercial conflicts this clause will not be covered.   
Clause 13: Factory acceptance test (FAT)  
The objective of this clause is to test the devices of the SIS to ensure that the requirements 
defined in the SRS are met.  Historically this process involved comparing the functional 
operation of the application logic (what it is supposed to do) to the traditional programmable 
logic diagrams (what it’s going to do) that are designed and programmed in the system such as 
ladder logic diagrams, function blocks, etc. A cause and effect diagram could further support the 
program validation depending on the system and its level of integration using cause and effect 
diagrams.  In some cases it may be available to test the application logic, via an intuitive 
interface that illustrates the logic in a simple and concise manner such as the cause and effect 
diagram rather than having to trace the logic thru one of the other conventional methods.  This 
would require that the system being used is capable of supporting both the ability to monitor 
online visualization of the logic, as well as a means to ‘record’ the interaction to generate a 
validation report to prove that the logic provided the correct outputs as it was designed. 
Clause 14 & 15: SIS installation and commissioning and safety validation  
The objective of these two clauses are to ensure that the SIS is properly installed, commissioned 
and validated according to the requirements as stated in the SRS.  Much of the requirements 
listed in clause 14 are geared toward the field devices (properly installed, grounded, calibrated 
and configured, etc.) however a detailed cause and effect diagram could be vital in recording and 
identifying these devices as well as documenting the interactions between the sensors (inputs) all 
the way thru to the final control elements (outputs).   
Clause 15 defines all the required validation planning activities for the entire SIS which is 
sometimes referred to as the site acceptance test (SAT). 
Clause 16: SIS operation and maintenance  
The objective of this clause is to ensure that the required SIL for each SIF is maintained during 
operation and maintenance of the SIS.  Depending on how integrated the cause and effect 
diagram is to the safety PLC operating the SIFs, will vary to what functions are available to meet 
the requirements of this objective.  Owner/operators would need to verify what their current 
system is capable of covering, but below are a few examples of how a cause and effect diagram 
maybe used to meet the operation and maintenance requirements: 
 System diagnostics that impact the performance of specific SIFs might be displayed on a 
cause and effect diagram to quickly draw the attention to the operator to reduce the time 
to repair. 
 Inspection and proof testing maybe conducted, recorded and documented using the online 
capability of the cause and effect diagram to meet SIL verification requirements. 
Clause 17 & 18: SIS modification and decommissioning  
The objectives of clauses 17 and 18 are to ensure that any changes (modification or 
decommissioning) to the SIS are properly planned, reviewed, approved and documented.  Today 
it’s well understood that depending on the plants circumstances, modifications may be necessary 
either online or offline and in either case rigorous revision tracking would be required, with the 
ultimate goal of maintaining the performance of the SIS.  In the case where a cause and effect 
diagram is well integrated with the SIS logic solver, much of the required documentation can be 
automatically updated as the system goes thru modifications as well as automatically updating 
the SRS to keep it current.   
 
Clause 19: Information and documentation requirements  
The objective of this clause is to ensure that all of the necessary information is available and 
documented to support all phases of the SIS safety life-cycle.  Figure 10 below summarizes the 
typical workflow between the safety life-cycle and a cause and effect program to minimize 
human errors through all phases.  
 
Figure 10 - Safety Lifecycle Workflow  
4 Summary 
The safety life-cycle is regarded as the foundation of the international functional safety 
standard for the process industries.  It recognized as an important engineering methodology, but 
documentation intensive process that is prone to errors.  A number of tools have been developed 
throughout the industry to try and address some of the leading contributors to failures 
(specifications, installation and commissioning, operations and maintenance, etc.) which are 
largely tied to human errors.  One approach the industry is looking towards is how a 
comprehensive cause and effect methodology that covers the SIS design, programming, 
operations, and maintenance tool tying together all phases to address the impact of human error 
through the life-cycle. 
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